Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution with source
  state errors in photon number space by Jiang, Cong et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
71
0.
08
21
6v
1 
 [q
ua
nt-
ph
]  
23
 O
ct 
20
17
Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution with source state errors
in photon number space
Cong Jiang1,2, Zong-Wen Yu1,3, and Xiang-Bin Wang1,2,4
∗†
1State Key Laboratory of Low Dimensional Quantum Physics, Department of Physics,
Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, Peoples Republic of China
2 Synergetic Innovation Center of Quantum Information and Quantum Physics, University of Science and Technology of China
Hefei, Anhui 230026, China
3Data Communication Science and Technology Research Institute, Beijing 100191, China
4 Jinan Institute of Quantum technology, SAICT, Jinan 250101, Peoples Republic of China
The existing decoy-state MDI-QKD theory assumes the perfect control of the source states which
is a an impossible task for any real setup. In this paper, we study the decoy-state MDI-QKD method
with source errors without any presumed conditions and we get the final security key rate only with
the range of a few parameters in the source state.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is one of the most
successful applications of quantum information process-
ing. QKD can provide unconditional security based on
the laws of quantum physics [1, 2]. Almost all of the exist-
ing setups of QKD use an imperfect single-photon source
which, in principle, suffers from the photon-number-
splitting (PNS) attack [3, 4]. Fortunately, the decoy-
state-method [5–14] can help to make a setup with an
imperfect single-photon source be as secure as that with a
perfect single-photon source [3, 4]. Aside from the source
imperfection, the limited detection efficiency is another
threat to the security [15]. The device independent QKD
(DI-QKD) [16] and the measurement-device-independent
QKD (MDI-QKD) [17, 18] have been proposed to over-
come the problem.
The key idea of MDI-QKD is that both Alice and
Bob send out quantum signals to the untrust third party
(UTP) but neither of them perform any measurement.
The UTP would perform a Bell state measurement to
each received pule pair and announce whether it’s a suc-
cessful event as well his measurement outcome in the
public channel. Those bits corresponding to successful
events will be post selected and further processed for the
final key. By using the decoy-state method, Alice and
Bob can use imperfect single-photon sources [17, 19] se-
curely in the MDI-QKD. Hence, the decoy-state MDI-
QKD can remove all detector side-channel attacks and
PNS attacks with imperfect single-photon sources. The
combination of the decoy-state method and MDI-QKD
has been studied both experimentally [20–25] and theo-
retically [19, 26–37].
The existing decoy-state MDI-QKD theory assumes
the perfect control of the source states. This is an im-
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possible task for any real setup in practice. As shown
in Ref. [12, 14], in BB84 decoy-state QKD protocol, the
intensity fluctuation, or more generally, the source errors
in Fock space may break the equality
sk = sk′ , (1)
where sk is the yield of k-photon decoy pulse and sk′ is
the yield of k-photon signal pulse. Similarly to the tra-
ditional decoy-state QKD protocol, the source used in
the decoy-state MDI-QKD protocol can not be perfectly
stable. One important problem is the effect of source
errors. In this paper, we would study the decoy-state
MDI-QKD method with source errors without any pre-
sumed conditions (In most of the case, we have no idea
about the details of source error, we can’t make any as-
sumptions to the source error model). Only with the
range of a few parameters in the source state, we could
get the final security key rate in the cost of little de-
crease. In our method, we have assumed the worst case
that Eve knows exactly the error of each pulse. Our
result immediately applies to all existing experimental
results. Before going further, we emphasize that our re-
sults here are unconditionally correct because we have
not assumed any unproven conditions. Although there is
another approach reported for the issue of intensity error
by using the model of attenuation to pulses from an un-
trusted source, however, there exists counter examples to
the elementary equation in that approach, as was shown
in the appendix of Ref. [14].
This paper is arranged as follows. After the Intro-
duction above, we present our method with the virtual
protocol and some definitions in Sec. II A and Sec. II B.
We then show the details in Sec. II C and Sec. IID about
how we formulate the final security key rate with only the
bound values of a few parameters in the states involved.
And in Sec. III, we will show some numerical simulation
results. The article is ended with a concluding remark.
2II. OUR METHOD
In the five-intensity decoy-state MDI-QKD protocol,
we assume that Alice (Bob) has two sources vA, xA (vB,
xB) in X basis and three sources wA, yA, zA (wB , yB,
zB) in Z basis, and they send pulse pairs (one pulse from
Alice, one pulse from Bob) to UTP one by one. Each
pulse sent out by Alice (Bob) is randomly chosen from
one of the five sources lA (rB) with constant probabil-
ity plA (prB ) respectively for l, r = v, x, w, y, z. Sources
vA, wA (vB , wB) are the unstable vacuum sources in X
and Z basis respectively. Generally, these unstable vac-
uum sources are not exact zeros photon-number state.
xA, yA (xB , yB) are the decoy sources which are used to
estimate the lower bounds of yield and the upper bound
of phase-flip error of single-photon pulse pairs. zA (zB)
is the signal source which is used to extract the final key.
We shall use notation lr to indicate the two-pulse
source when Alice use source lA and Bob use source rB
to generate a pulse pair. For simplicity, we omit the sub-
scripts of any l and r for a two-pulse source, eg., source
yz is the source that Alice uses source yA and Bob uses
source zB. We also denote the number of counts caused
by the two-pulse source lr asNlr. Nlr are observed values
and will be regarded as known values.
A. Virtual protocol
For clarity, we first consider a virtual protocol. Sup-
pose Alice and Bob send Nt pulse pairs to UTP in the
whole protocol. In photon-number space, the states of
the ith pulse pair from source lA (rB) is
ρilA =
∑
k
al,ik |k〉〈k| (ρ
i
rB
=
∑
k
br,ik |k〉〈k|), (2)
for l, r = v, x, w, y, z. At any time i(i ∈ [1, Nt]), Alice
(Bob) choose only one source from lA (rB) with constant
probability plA (prB ) respectively. The unselected pulses
will be discarded. After UTP has completed all mea-
surements to the incident pulse pairs, Alice (Bob) checks
the record about which pulse is selected at each time,
i.e., which time has used which source. Obviously, Alice
(Bob) can decide which source is to be used at each time
in the very beginning. This is just then the real protocol
of the decoy-state method. Videlicet, the formulas we
get under such a virtual protocol will hold for the real
protocol.
B. Some definitions
Definition 1. In the protocol, Alice and Bob send Nt
pulse pairs to UTP, one by one. If UTP announces that
it’s a successful event, then we say that the ith pulse pair
has caused a count.
Given the source state in Eq. (2), any ith pulse sent
out by Alice (Bob) must be in a photon number state.
We shall make use of this fact that any individual pulse
is in one Fock state.
Definition 2. Set C and cjk: Set C contains any pulse
pair that has caused a count; set cjk contains any |jk〉-
photon pulse pair (Alice’s j−photon pulse and Bob’s
k−photon pulse) that has caused a count. Mathemat-
ically speaking, the sufficient and necessary condition for
i ∈ C is that the ith pulse pair has caused a count.
The sufficient and necessary condition for i ∈ cjk is that
the ith pulse pair is a |jk〉−photon pulse pair and it
has caused a count. For instance, if the photon num-
ber sates of the first 10 pulse pairs sent to UTP are
|00〉, |00〉, |01〉, |02〉, |11〉, |12〉, |01〉, |10〉, |00〉, |11〉, and the
pulse pairs of i = 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9 each has caused a count,
then we have C = {i|i = 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, . . .}, c00 = {i|i =
2, 9, . . .}, c01 = {i|i = 3, 7, . . . }, c10 = {i|i = 8, . . . }.
Clearly, C = ∪j,k≥0cjk.
Definition 3. We use superscripts U,L for the upper
bound and lower bound of a certain parameter. In par-
ticular, given any k ≥ 0 in Eq. (2), we denote al,Uk , a
l,L
k
(br,Uk , b
r,L
k ) for the maximum value and minimum value
of {al,ik |i ∈ C} ({b
r,i
k |i ∈ C}), and l, r = v, x, w, y, z. We
assume these bound values are known in the protocol.
C. The lower bound of counts of single-photon
pulse pairs
Here in this subsection, we only need to consider the
pulse pairs in Z basis. According to our definitions, if
the ith pulse pair is an element of cjk, the probability
that it is from source lr is
P lri|jk = plpra
l,i
j b
r,i
k d
i
jk, (l, r = w, y, z), (3)
where
dijk =
1∑
l,r=w,y,z plpra
l,i
j b
r,i
k
. (4)
We want to formulate the numbers of |jk〉−photon pulse
pair counts caused by each two-pulse source. Given the
definition of the set cjk, this is equivalent to asking how
many pulse pairs in set cjk come from each two-pulse
source. The probability that the ith pulse pair (i ∈ cjk)
comes from source lr is P lr
i|jk, and equivalently,
nlrjk =
∑
i∈cjk
P lri|jk, (5)
where nlrjk is the numbers of |jk〉−photon pulse pair
counts caused by source lr. Since every pulse pair in
cjk has caused a count, therefore we can formulate the
total pulse pair counts caused by source lr by
Nlr =
∑
j,k≥0
nlrjk =
∑
j,k≥0
∑
i∈cjk
plpra
l,i
j b
r,i
k d
i
jk. (6)
3We also need to introduce the following notation
N˜lr =
∑
j,k≥1
∑
i∈cjk
plpra
l,i
j b
r,i
k d
i
jk. (7)
If we define
Djk =
∑
i∈cjk
dijk, (8)
our goal as stated in the very beginning of Sec.II is simple
to find out the lower bound of D11. For, with this and
Def. 3, the lower bound of the number of counts caused
by those single-photon pulse pairs from the source lr, i.e.,
nlr11 is
nlr,L11 = plpra
l,L
1 b
r,L
1 D11 ≤ n
lr
11. (9)
In what follows, we shall first find the formula of D11
in terms of N˜yy, N˜zz based on Eq. (7).
N˜yy = p
2
ya
y,U
1 b
y,U
1 D11 + p
2
yΛ − ξ1, (10)
N˜zz = p
2
za
z,L
1 b
z,L
1 D11 + p
2
zΛ
′ + ξ2, (11)
where
Λ =
∑
J
ay,Uj b
y,U
k Djk, Λ
′ =
∑
J
az,Lj b
z,L
k Djk, (12)
ξ1 = p
2
y
∑
j,k≥1
∑
i∈cjk
(ay,Uj b
y,U
k − a
y,i
j b
y,i
k )d
i
jk ≥ 0, (13)
ξ2 = p
2
z
∑
j,k≥1
∑
i∈cjk
(az,ij b
z,i
k − a
z,L
j b
z,L
k )d
i
jk ≥ 0, (14)
with
J = {j, k|j ≥ 1, k ≥ 1, jk ≥ 2}. (15)
Without losing the generality, we assume Ka =
a
z,L
1
b
z,L
2
a
y,U
1
b
y,U
2
≤
a
z,L
2
b
z,L
1
a
y,U
2
b
y,U
1
= Kb (in the case of Ka > Kb, the
results can be obtained similarly). According to the def-
initions of Λ and Λ′, we have
Λ′ = KaΛ +
ξ3
p2z
, (16)
where
ξ3
p2z
=
∑
J
(az,Lj b
z,L
k −Kaa
y,U
j b
y,U
k )Djk. (17)
Further, we assume the important conditions
az,Lk
ay,Uk
≥
az,L2
ay,U2
≥
az,L1
ay,U1
,
bz,Lk
by,Uk
≥
bz,L2
by,U2
≥
bz,L1
by,U1
, (18)
for all k ≥ 2. The imperfect sources with small error
used in practice such as the coherent state source, the
heralded source out of the parametric down-conversion,
could satisfy the above restriction.
With the assumption Ka ≤ Kb, one may easily prove
that ξ3 ≥ 0. Thus Eq. (11) can be rewritten into
N˜zz = p
2
za
z,L
1 b
z,L
1 D11 + p
2
zKaΛ + ξ2 + ξ3. (19)
Combining Eqs. (10,19), we get the lower bound of D11
D11 ≥ D
L
11 =
b
z,L
2
p2y
N˜Lyy −
b
z,L
2
p2zKa
N˜Uzz
ay,U1 (b
y,U
1 b
z,L
2 − b
y,U
2 b
z,L
1 )
, (20)
where N˜Lyy and N˜
U
zz are the lower and upper bounds of
N˜yy and N˜zz respectively that will be evaluated in the
coming. In obtaining Eq. (20), we have used the facts
that ξ1, ξ2 and ξ3 are all nonnegative values.
In what follows, we shall formulate the lower bound
of N˜yy and the upper bound of N˜zz. These bounds can
be easily obtained if we assume that Alice and Bob can
prepare the vacuum source. However, in practice, the
different intensities are usually generated with an inten-
sity modulator, which has a finite extinction ratio. So
it is usually difficult to create a perfect vacuum state in
decoy-state QKD experiments. In the following of this
paper, we will show that these bounds can also be for-
mulated without using the perfect vacuum source.
Similarly to the conditions in Eq. (18), we also assume
al,ik
aw,ik
≥
al,i1
aw,i1
,
br,ik
bw,ik
≥
br,i1
bw,i1
, (l, r = y, z) (21)
for all i ∈ C. The lower bound of N˜yy and the upper
bound of N˜zz can be expressed by
N˜Lyy =
Nyy − n˜
w,U
yy
1 + σyC
, N˜Uzz =
Nzz − n˜
w,L
zz
1− σzA − σ
z
B
, (22)
where σyC =
a
y,U
0
b
y,U
0
a
w,U
1
b
w,U
1
a
w,L
0
b
w,L
0
a
y,L
1
b
y,L
1
, σzA =
a
z,U
0
a
w,U
1
a
w,L
0
a
z,L
1
, σzB =
b
z,U
0
b
w,U
1
b
w,L
0
b
z,L
1
, and
n˜w,Uyy =
py
pw
ay,U0
aw,L0
Nwy +
py
pw
by,U0
bw,L0
Nyw −
p2y
p2w
ay,L0 b
y,L
0
aw,U0 b
w,U
0
Nww,
(23)
n˜w,Lzz =
pz
pw
az,L0
aw,U0
Nwz +
pz
pw
bz,L0
bw,U0
Nzw −
p2z
p2w
az,U0 b
z,U
0
aw,L0 b
w,L
0
Nww.
(24)
The detailed proof of Eq. (22) can be found in Appendix
A. With Eqs. (20, 22), we could formulate DL11 with only
known parameters. Eq. (22) is the most important con-
clusion in this paper.
With these preparation, we can now bound the fraction
of counts of single-photon pulse pair among all counts
caused by the signal source zz
∆′11 =
nzz11
Nzz
≥
p2za
z,L
1 b
z,L
1 D
L
11
Nzz
= ∆′L11. (25)
4Define Slr =
Nlr
plprNt
as the yield of source lr. Then, we
have
∆′L11 =
az,L1 b
z,L
1 (
a
z,L
1
b
z,L
2
S˜yy
1+σ
y
C
−
a
y,U
1
b
y,U
2
S˜zz
1−σz
A
−σz
B
)
ay,U1 a
z,L
1 (b
y,U
1 b
z,L
2 − b
y,U
2 b
z,L
1 )Szz
, (26)
where
S˜yy =Syy −
ay,U0 Swy
aw,L0
−
by,U0 Syw
bw,L0
+
ay,L0 b
y,L
0 Sww
aw,U0 b
w,U
0
, (27)
S˜zz =Szz −
az,L0 Swz
aw,U0
−
bz,L0 Szw
bw,U0
+
az,U0 b
z,U
0 Sww
aw,L0 b
w,L
0
. (28)
D. The upper bound of the phase-flip error rate of
single-photon pulse pairs
In order to estimate the final key rate, we also need
the upper bound of phase-flip error rate of single-photon
pulse pair, i.e., e11, which means we need to formulate the
upper bound of phase-flip error counts of single-photon
pulse pairs first. Here in this subsection, we only need
consider the pulse pairs in X basis. Similarly to Def. 2 in
Sec.II A, we define set H which contains all pulse pairs
that has caused an error count and hjk which contains
all |jk〉-photon pulse pair that has caused an error count.
The probability that the ith pulse pair (i ∈ hjk) is from
each two-pulse source lr (l, r = v, x) is
Qlri|jk = plpra
l,i
j b
r,i
k g
i
jk, (l, r = v, x). (29)
where
gijk =
1∑
l,r=v,x plpra
l,i
j b
r,i
k
. (30)
If we denote the number of error counts caused by the
source lr as Mlr, we have
Mxx = m
v
xx +
∑
i∈h11
p2xa
x,i
1 b
x,i
1 g
i
11 +
∑
J
∑
i∈hjk
p2xa
x,i
j b
x,i
k g
i
jk,
(31)
where
mvxx =
∑
k≥0
∑
i∈h0k
p2xa
x,i
0 b
x,i
k g
i
0k +
∑
j≥0
∑
i∈hj0
p2xa
x,i
j b
x,i
0 g
i
j0
−
∑
i∈h00
p2xa
x,i
0 b
x,i
0 g
i
00. (32)
If we define
M˜xx =Mxx −m
v
xx, (33)
Eq. (31) can be written into
M˜xx =
∑
i∈h11
p2xa
x,i
1 b
x,i
1 g
i
11 +
∑
J
∑
i∈hjk
p2xa
x,i
j b
x,i
k g
i
jk,
≥p2xa
x,L
1 b
x,L
1 G11, (34)
where
G11 =
∑
i∈h11
gi11. (35)
Our goal now is to formulate the upper bound of G11.
For, we have
mxx11 ≤ p
2
xa
x,U
1 b
x,U
1 G11 = m
xx,U
11 , (36)
where mxx11 is the number of error counts of single-photon
pulse pairs for source xx, and mxx,U11 is the upper bound
of mxx11 .
With the same method to upper bound N˜yy, the upper
bound of G11 can be formulated by
GU11 =
1
ax,L1 b
x,L
1 (1− σ
x
A − σ
x
B)
[
Mxx
p2x
−
1
pvpx
ax,L0
av,U0
Mvx
−
1
pvpx
bx,L0
bv,U0
Mxv +
1
p20
ax,U0 b
x,U
0
av,L0 b
v,L
0
Mvv
]
, (37)
where σxA =
a
x,U
0
a
v,U
1
a
v,L
0
a
x,L
1
, σxB =
b
x,U
0
b
v,U
1
b
v,L
0
b
x,L
1
. Thus, we can get
the upper bound of the error rate of single-photon pulse
pairs
e11 =
mxx11
nxx11
≤
ax,U1 b
x,U
1 G
U
11
ax,L1 b
x,L
1 D
L
11
= eU11. (38)
Define Tαβ =
Mlr
plprNt
as the error yield of source lr. We
have
eU11 =
ax,U1 b
x,U
1 T˜xx
(ax,L1 b
x,L
1 )
2(1 − σxA − σ
x
B)s
x,L
11
, (39)
where
T˜xx = Txx −
ax,L0 Tvx
av,U0
−
bx,L0 Txv
bv,U0
+
ax,U0 b
x,U
0 Tvv
av,L0 b
v,L
0
, (40)
and sx,L11 = D
L
11/Nt is the yield of single-photon pulse
pair. Here we have used the fact that the lower bound
of yield of single-photon pulse pair in X basis can be
estimated by the lower bound of it in Z basis.
III. THE FINAL KEY RATE AND NUMERICAL
SIMULATION
In this section, we present some numerical simulations.
Firstly, we shall estimate what values would be probably
observed for the yields and error yields in the normal
cases by the linear models [34]. With these known values,
we can calculate the lower bound of counting rate and
the upper bound of phase-flip error rate of single-photon
pulse pair with Eq. (26) and Eq. (39) respectively. Then
the final key rate can be calculated by
R = Szz{∆
′L
11[1−H(e
U
11)]− fH(Ezz)}, (41)
5e0 ed pd ηd f αf
0.5 1.5% 6.02 × 10−6 14.5% 1.16 0.2
TABLE I: List of experimental parameters used in numeri-
cal simulations. e0: error rate of the vacuum count. ed: the
misalignment-error probability. pd: the dark count rate of
UTP’s detectors. ηd: the detection efficiency of UTP’s detec-
tors. f : the error correction inefficiency. αf : the fiber loss
coefficient (dB/km).
where f is the error correction inefficiency and H(x) =
−x log2 x− (1− x) log2(1− x) is the binary Shannon en-
tropy function.
We focus on the symmetric case where the two channel
transmissions from Alice to UTP and from Bob to UTP
are equal. We also assume that the UTP’s detectors are
identical, i.e., they have the same dark count rates and
detection efficiencies, and their detection efficiencies do
not depend on the incoming signals. The density matrix
of the coherent state with intensity µ can be written into
ρ =
∑
k
e−µµk
k!
|k〉〈k|. The actual intensity of the ith pulse
for source l out of Alice’s (or Bob’s) laboratory is
µil = µl(1 + δ
i
l ), (l = v, x, w, y, z), (42)
with the boundary conditions |δil | ≤ δ1 for l = v, w and
|δil | ≤ δ2 for l = x, y, z.
Experimental conditions and the detectors properties
are listed in Table I. Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 show the key rates
versus transmission distance. The red solid curve is the
result of the protocol with infinite number of decoy states,
and other curves are the results for the protocol discussed
in this work with different intensity fluctuation.
IV. CONCLUSION
In summary, we have shown how to calculate the
lower bound of the fraction of single-photon pulse pair
counts and the upper bound of the phase-flip error rate
of the single-photon pulse pair in the decoy state MDI-
QKD with source errors, provided that the parameters
in the diagonal state of the source satisfy equation (18)
and (21) and bound values of each parameters in the
state is known. Our result here can be extended to the
nonasymptotic case by taking statistical fluctuations into
consideration in Eq. (26) and Eq. (39). This will be re-
ported elsewhere.
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6Appendix A: The proof of the lower and upper
bounds of N˜yy, N˜zz and M˜xx
Firstly, we formulate the lower and upper bounds of
N˜yy. The lower and upper bounds of M˜xx and N˜zz can
be obtained similarly.
We could write Nwy,Nyw,Nww and Nyy in the form of
Eq. (6)
Nwy =
∑
j,k≥0
∑
i∈cjk
pwpya
w,i
l b
y,i
m d
i
jk, (A.1)
Nyw =
∑
j,k≥0
∑
i∈cjk
pwpya
y,i
l b
w,i
m d
i
jk, (A.2)
Nww =
∑
j,k≥0
∑
i∈cjk
p2wa
w,i
l b
w,i
m d
i
jk, (A.3)
Nyy =
∑
j,k≥0
∑
i∈cjk
p2ya
y,i
l b
y,i
m d
i
jk. (A.4)
After a series of calculation, Eq. (A.4) can be rewritten
in the following equivalent form
Nyy = n˜
w
yy + N˜yy −A−B + C, (A.5)
where
n˜wyy = p
2
y
∑
j,k≥0
∑
i∈cjk
ay,i0
aw,i0
aw,ij b
y,i
k d
i
jk
+
∑
j,k≥0
∑
i∈cjk
by,i0
bw,i0
ay,ij b
w,i
k d
i
jk
−
∑
j,k≥0
∑
i∈cjk
ay,i0 b
y,i
0
aw,i0 b
w,i
0
aw,ij b
w,i
k d
i
jk
 ,
A = p2y
∑
j,k≥1
∑
i∈cjk
ay,i0
aw,i0
aw,ij b
y,i
k d
i
jk,
B = p2y
∑
j,k≥1
∑
i∈cjk
by,i0
bw,i0
ay,ij b
w,i
k d
i
jk,
C = p2y
∑
j,k≥1
∑
i∈cjk
ay,i0 b
y,i
0
aw,i0 b
w,i
0
aw,ij b
w,i
k d
i
jk.
One may easily prove that
nwyy = n˜
w
yy −A−B + C,
where
nwyy =
∑
k≥0
∑
i∈c0,k
p2ya
y,i
0 b
y,i
k d
i
0k +
∑
j≥0
∑
i∈cj,0
p2ya
y,i
j b
y,i
0 d
i
j0
−
∑
i∈c0,0
p2ya
y,i
0 b
y,i
0 d
i
00.
Given Eqs. (A.1-A.3), the lower bound and upper bound
of n˜wyy could be formulated as
n˜w,Lyy =
py
pw
ay,L0
aw,U0
Nwy +
py
pw
by,L0
bw,U0
Nyw −
p2y
p2w
ay,U0 b
y,U
0
aw,L0 b
w,L
0
Nww,
n˜w,Uyy =
py
pw
ay,U0
aw,L0
Nwy +
py
pw
by,U0
bw,L0
Nyw −
p2y
p2w
ay,L0 b
y,L
0
aw,U0 b
w,U
0
Nww.
It is easy to know that the lower bound of A,B and C is
just
AL = 0, BL = 0, CL = 0. (A.6)
The upper bound of A,B and C could be formulated as
follows
C = p2y
∑
j,k≥1
∑
i∈cjk
ay,i0 b
y,i
0
aw,i0 b
w,i
0
aw,ij b
w,i
k d
i
jk,
= p2y
∑
j,k≥1
∑
i∈cjk
σU1 a
w,i
j b
w,i
k d
i
jk − ζ1
= p2y
∑
j,k≥1
∑
i∈cjk
σU1
aw,i1 b
w,i
1
ay,i1 b
y,i
1
ay,ij b
y,i
k d
i
jk − ζ1 − ζ2,
= p2y
∑
j,k≥1
∑
i∈cjk
σU1 σ
U
2 a
y,i
j b
y,i
k d
i
jk − ζ1 − ζ2 − ζ3,
where
σU1 =
ay,U0 b
y,U
0
aw,L0 b
w,L
0
, σU2 =
aw,U1 b
w,U
1
ay,L1 b
y,L
1
,
ζ1 = p
2
y
∑
j,k≥1
∑
i∈cjk
(σU1 −
ay,i0 b
y,i
0
aw,i0 b
w,i
0
)aw,ij b
w,i
k d
i
jk ≥ 0,
ζ2 = p
2
y
∑
j,k≥1
∑
i∈cjk
σU1 (
aw,i1 b
w,i
1
ay,i1 b
y,i
1
ay,ij b
y,i
k − a
w,i
j b
w,i
k )d
i
jk,
ζ3 = p
2
y
∑
j,k≥1
∑
i∈cjk
σU1 (σ
U
2 −
aw,i1 b
w,i
1
ay,i1 b
y,i
1
)ay,ij b
y,i
k d
i
jk ≥ 0,
ζ2 ≥ 0 can be directly obtained with Eq. (21). We have
CU = σU1 σ
U
2 N˜yy. (A.7)
Similarly, the upper bounds of A and B are
AU = σyAN˜yy, B
U = σyBN˜yy, (A.8)
where
σyA =
ay,U0 a
w,U
1
aw,L0 a
y,L
1
, σyB =
by,U0 b
w,U
1
bw,L0 b
y,L
1
. (A.9)
With Eq. (A.5), we have
N˜yy = Nyy−n˜
w
yy+A+B−C ≥ Nyy−n˜
w,U
yy −C
U , (A.10)
and
N˜yy ≤ Nyy − n˜
w,L
yy + A
U +BU . (A.11)
7Combining Eq. (A.7) with Eq. (A.10), we can formulate
N˜Lyy as follows
N˜Lyy =
Nyy − n˜
w,U
yy
1 + σyC
, (A.12)
where σyC = σ
U
1 σ
U
2 .
Combining Eq. (A.8) with Eq. (A.11), we can formulate
N˜Uyy as
N˜Uyy =
Nyy − n˜
w,L
yy
1− σyA − σ
y
B
, (A.13)
where σyA and σ
y
B have been defined in Eq. (A.9).
By using the same way, we can formulate the lower and
upper bounds of N˜zz and M˜xx. Actually, we only need
the upper bounds of N˜zz and M˜xx. Explicitly, we have
N˜zz =
Nzz − n˜
w,L
zz
1− σzA − σ
z
B
, M˜xx =
Mxx − m˜
v,L
xx
1− σxA − σ
x
B
, (A.14)
where
n˜w,Lzz =
pz
pw
az,L0
aw,U0
Nwz +
pz
pw
bz,L0
bw,U0
Nzw −
p2z
p2w
az,U0 b
z,U
0
aw,L0 b
w,L
0
Nww,
m˜v,Lxx =
px
pv
ax,L0
av,U0
Mvx +
px
pv
bx,L0
bv,U0
Mxv −
p2x
p2v
ax,U0 b
x,U
0
av,L0 b
v,L
0
Mvv,
and
σzA =
az,U0 a
w,U
1
aw,L0 a
z,L
1
, σzB =
bz,U0 b
w,U
1
bw,L0 b
z,L
1
,
σxA =
ax,U0 a
v,U
1
av,L0 a
x,L
1
, σxB =
bx,U0 b
v,U
1
bv,L0 b
x,L
1
.
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